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DISCUSSION ON FUNCTIONAL NERVOUS STATES IN RELATION
TO SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES Lord Horder: I shall deal vith this subject largely from the angle of the Medical Recruiting Boards. The fulnction of these Boards is to provide men for the fighting services who are physically and mentally fit. Twvo facts are important: conscription, which was introduced at the outbreak of the tvar, and the urgent demand for man-power.
The Civil Medical Boards were not concerned with posting. This is often not realized. Yide Lanicet of May 4, 1940, where a leader opened by the words: " those responsible for recruiting cannot claim to be doing everything possible to ensure economy and efficiencv w . while pegs that are . . . square are being put into round holes." In aniother leader on February 21, 1942, a more proportionate view is taken . . " Doctors have enough experience of the wide range of wvhat is normal and healthv to abstain from rejecting men who have a defect that had not interfered with active civilian life . . . it would be a sorry thing if examining Mledical Boards assumed that the Services could only utilize men with the equipment of mind and body required, for example, by an R.A.F. pilot or a member of the Royal Armoured Corps
The responsibility of grading rests with the members of the Board and a manl's grading must be determined at as earlv a stage as possible consistent with reasonable accuracy. To accumulate blocs of men and women awaiting final disposal would greatlv encumber the machinery of recruitment.
The material presenting itself before the Boards is more heterogeneouLs as the result of conscription than was the case in the days of voluntary service. The approach is made from three points-phvsical, constitutional and psychological. The overlap betveen the approaches is obvious. Physical defects are easily detected; constitutional defects are more difficult. Medical Boards are enjoined to consider " the general condition and physique " in every case, but in the absence of any criteria of what Alvarez has called " constitutional inadequacy " it is very difficult, in the thirtv minutes at their disposal, to do much about it. It requires large experience to say of any particular man that on grounds of his physique alone he will not make good in the armed forces. If encouraged to do much along this line Boards would probably have put Nelson in Grade IV. "His nervous system was always frightened but his awareness knew no fear."
In an inspired leader in The Tinmes of March 5, 1942, on ' The Mind of the Recruit" the writer says that the " chief business of a Medical Board, like that of a practising physician, is prognosis ". Surely the chief business of both is diagnosis with a view to prognosis. That the mind of the recruit, no less than his body, (letermines his fitness for service, is not challenged; nor that " trustworthy conclusions about the mind . . are difficult to reach in the limited time available ". But a special examination of everv recruit's mind by a psychiatrist has not been considered to be in the general interest. Nor has it been thought helpful in the identification of psychoneurotics to ask the recruit to answer a questionnaire before examination. The Advisory Committee was anxious to avoid " snap " diagnoses on the one hand and the making of nervous invalids on the other. The danger of creating and of spreading doubts and fears and anxieties bv delving into the personality of the recruiit duiring a rapid and necessarilv direct inquirv was not to be underestimated.
Then there was the suiggestion that recruits should be asked the degree of their willingness or uinwillingness to serve, so that the unLvilling ones might be posted to a special training centre. This, too, was not accepted, because it seemed to raise a good many issuLes which lav outside even the psyclhiatrist's brief. Let us face the question squarelv. How many men would not, in the laniguLage of the prize ring, " ptull their punch ", if dealt with by methods like this? So-called " errors " in grading are to a certain extent inevitable: some five million men have passed throuigh these Boards sinice war began: but on the basis of the examination MIARCH-NIED. I Proceedings of the Royal Socidety of Medicine 2 which the Civil Boards are required to make, the proportion of men passed as fit for service and found later to be unfit has been very small. I say " on the basis of the examination which the Civil Boards are required to make ", because if this basis is a different one for passing as fit and for discharging as unfit, and if the needs of the armed forces as understood by the Advisory Committee of the Civil Boards and those accepted by the armed forces themselves do not harmonize, then, clearly, considerable anomalies will arise. And in the first and second years of the war considerable ancmalies did arise. During one particular six months towards the end of 1941 an average number of some 1,300 men per month were discharged from the Army on account of psychoneurosis, many of them within a few months of enlistment. Many thousands of men have been thrown back into civil life (where they had previously made good), and this fact was read as an indictment upon the work of the Civil Medical Boards.
Turning now to the actual Army requirements. There is little doubt that it has taken the authorities some time to discover the extent, and nature, of their needs. This is but part of the inevitable lag in the development and expansion of the Service and the consequent disposal of its personnel. The steady upgrading of Army duties as the result of mechanization has left much of its personnel relatively out of breath. It has been estimated that 5% of all recruits are unable to learn the duties of the modern soldier, and another 5% can only do so if trained in special squads (Esher). In return for the criticism of the Civil Medical Boards that they did not turn down men because they were unlikelv to be up to the standard required. the Advisory Committee pointed out that it is not in its reference to post men to particular duties but that it did seem very desirable that " all practicable steps should be taken to secure the allocation of men to different branches of the Army and to duties suited to their capabilities ". The Committee pointed out that careful posting not only salvaged man-power, it minimized the risk of those very breakdowns which the psychiatrists feared-an example of a general principle in the treatment of psychological inadequacy.
The introduction of simple intelligence tests intended to facilitate suitable posting naturally received the Committee's blessing. More than that, the Committee drew attention to the obvious disadvantages of discharging any recruit unless it is clear that his physical or mental state renders further Army employment impracticable. The new policy of sending all recruits to general service Corps and to primary training centres for examination and posting is the proper answer to the difficulty and this has been implemented.
The first duty of a soldier is to learn endurance. This may be quite foreign to his nature or to his previous environment. He may hitherto have been' a parasite upon society, as most neurotics are. He must now largely lose his individuality, he must accept discipline, he must forgo much of his privacv, he must submit to many, and gross, personal inconveniences. But he should be given a good trial of his capacity for adjustment to these new things, of his abilitv to become extravert in his behaviour. If he is discharged before he gets this chance a great disservice may be done to him, as well as to the community. This is being slowly realized. The new Q Sections are proving a success. Men with mental ages of 6 or 7 are doing useful work in these sections. rhey realize they are doing work of national importance and doing it well.
The Directorate of selection of nersonnel has developed rapidly. An account of this by C. S. Myers appeared in the Lancet, 1942 (ii), 491. It is to be honed that the pendulum may not swing too far in this new direction, giving the exponents the notion that mental cests have established permanent criteria. Raven points ouit that the reaction of neurotics to mental tests is very unreliable since they record an activity which varies with health, i'Vith incentive and with immediate and remote distractions. And Myers reminds us that tests of personality are far less reliable than tests of aptitude. Since personality counts for so much in soldiering, especially in the officer group, the warning is opportune. Character and temperament, integrity and sociability elude our tests much more than does mere intelligence; and unless we give " intelligence " a very limited definition much of it eludes them also.
Surgeon Captain Desmond Curran: The problem of functional nervous states in relation to service in the Navy necessarily differs from that in the other Services. It is of course true that the Navy has on the whole been subjected to more nrolonged and severe stress than has the Army or the R.A.F.-with the exception of its flying personnel. But the increased incidence that might be expected to result from this is probably more than counterbalanced by the quality of the men who were in the Navy before the war or who have s'ibsequently volunteered or expressed a naval preference when called up. To be a volunteer produces an initial selection of great value (although some do so for mistaken reasons such as the hope that the fresh air will be good for their nerves); and since more men have always wanted to join the Navv than could be taken, the opportunity has existed foI a further selection from an already highly selected group. Again the expansion of the Navy has been relatively much smaller. The only reasonable inference is that the pioblems in the three Services are not really comparable. We have, for example, a much easier task than that which coinfronts the Army.
Organization.-This is based upon certain principles. Firstly, that neurology and psychiatry should be regarded as two aspects of one subject closely linked with general medicine. Hence, our neuropsychiatric units have been formed, as far as possible, as an integral part of the main naval hosnitals. A close association with general medicine and surgery can be to the advantage of all concerned. The great danger for psychiatry is to become a special cult; the great danger for a special psychiatric hospital is to obtain the reputation of a " looney bin " the entry to which is a prelude to invaliding; and a great danger for general medicine is to neglect the psychological aspect of illness which assumes such increased importance in war time.
The second principle is that of the necessity for early treatment, with special emphasis tipon the avoidance of hospitalization. One of the most important functions of a neuropsychiatrist in war time is to decide what cases do not need hospital care. Hence, outpatient centres have been instituted in the main naval depots through which men pass before draft.
Thirdly, it was considered essential to try to reduce to a minimutm the incentive to " escape " by the development of an illness. The netiropsychiatrist is constantly confronted with the dilemma whether to put a man on duty who is liable to prove unsatisf:actory or to crack, or whether, by invaliding such individuals, he is making escape too easy and thus creating a bad precedent. Hence, a special rehabilitation unit has been formed. The main value of such a unit is the imponderable one of prophylaxis in providing an incentive to certain men to face their personalitv disabilities and defects; but there can be little doubt about its immediate value at all events for a ntumber of the men who have been sent there.
Finally, some steps have been takeni to deal with the most importalit sLibject of all, that of pre-selection.
Numbers. In view of the continuous stress to which the Navx has been subjected, the problem of functional nervous states has been a small one; butt from the medical standpoint, the problem has been a substantial one.
From our experience, we would suggest that 10°, to 150% of the beds of a large hospital should be set aside for neuropsychiatric cases.
,tiology. War stress, in the sense of direct experience of enemy action is not, of course, the only cause of breakdown in war time. Removal from home and previous ways of living, the restrictions and regimentation of Service life, and domestic problems, are obviously the important factors in a large number of cases. Sexual factors play only an insignificant part.
Types of reactioni. Gross conversion hysteria (paralysis, mutism) is verv uncommon.
It was also uncommon in the Navv in the last war. Most of the cases we see show affective reactions, i.e. states of anxiety and depression combined in various proportions; but they are usually complicated or prolonged by hysterical or escape mechanisms. It can be said in crude terms that the better type of man struggles on until he has develoned an affective reaction of some intensity; whilst the less tough either develop a " purely " hysterical condition or succumb to quite minor affective symptoms. This difference is well shown in the figures from one neuropsvchiatric unit, where hysteria as a primary diagnosis was made in 150% of the ratings admitted and in only 40h of the officers. Mental deficiencv as a primary diagnosis has accounted for onlv some 5% to 7% of all neuropsychiatric cases seen. A very low level of intelligence as jtudged by tests is compatible with apparent efficiency in such branches as ordinarv seamen or stokers so long s.S the men are stable: a mental age of 9 vears plus (Kent Oral) does, however, appear to be the lower limit. An intelligence test score is of couLrse onlv one item of information in the diagnosis of mental defect, and the stabilitv of the individual often possesses greater practical importance. The wisdom in labelling or dogging men with intelligence test results therefore seems to be most dubious, Psvchosomatic manifestations are verv common. " The nerves go to the stomach " with special frequency or show themselves in the form of headaches. "Effort svndrome" is rare buit is showing signs of increase mainlv amongst Marines who are called upon to march. Variouis ocular manifestations are rather frequent. The low incidence of btyperthyroidism is aI matter of some suirprise for the precipitation of a fair number of cases bv severe stress might have been expected; lbut it has not happened. Results. A striking psvchiatric lesson of var time is the extent of personal adaptability. In one representative depot it has been found possible to keep about 900% of the new cases seen at some form of duttv: the remainder are either invalided directly or are referred to hospital. But post-concussional cases do not do wvell. As regards in-patients, in one neuropsychiatric unit about 750% of admissions were sent back to some form of duty. The average duration of stay was just over three wveeks for those returned to duty, and just over four weeks for those invalided. So far as is known the relapse rate is surprisingly small. On the whole a better type of man is being seen as the war goes on. Thus in one depot over half the newv cases seen had been in the Navy for over two years. But the major part of our clientele is, and alwvays has been, composed of men who are " King's hard bargains". Mvany have never been to sea at all. The results quoted above may seem good, but many we have sent back to dutv are doutbtful assets to the Navy. We would have invalided more had it not been for the question of example to others. The high wages to be earned in civilian life add greatly to the diffictulties.
Pre-selectioni. The matter of pre-selection is therefore of fundamental importance to Service psychiatric work. How effective good selection can be is well shown in the case of submariners amongst whom the breakdown rate is negligible. A careful selection for all men entering the Navv is obviously desirable, but how far is it possible?
Difficulties have arisen partly because the Ministrv of Labour Medical Boards and the fighting Services are to some extent at cross puLrposes. The function of the former is to assess a man's fitness for some form of National Service; it is not their function to decide what form that service should take, and still less, for example, to decide that a man is fit for the stress of service at sea. Mloreover, mtuch cmphasis is laid by these medical boards upon the obligation, and stringent precautions are taken to ensure that men do not evade their duty by " feigning " illness. No one desires tllat the lot of the shirker or the scoundrel should be an easy one; but eqtually, no one would desire stuch individtuals as members of a ship's company.
From the naval point of view the following quotation from an official circular to recruliting boards in the U.S.A. expresses the situiation admirably:
"The Army is in no sense a social service or a curative agency. It is to be consi(lered neither a haven of rest for wanderers, nor a corrective school for misfits, ne'er-do-wvells, feeble-minded persons or chronic offenders. Furthermore, it is neither a gymnasiuLm for the training and development of the under-nourished or undeveloped. nor a psychiatric clinic for proper adjustment of adult emotional development. Therefore there is no place in the Army for physical or mental weaklings, potentially psychotic or pre-psvchotic persons or those with behaviour problems. Men who present behaviour problems in the civilian commuinitv wvill certainly present intensified problems in the Service."
An attempt has been made in the Navy to remedy somieC of the present defects in selection. A number of men are passed Grade I med(ically who are not Grade I from the psychiatric standpoint. The standards to be adopted for acceptance must depend upon the excess of the supply over the demand and the efficiency of the selection procedure.
The other limiting factor is that certain men are not worth taking at all no matter what the man-power position may be. As it wvas obviouisly impossible for every man to be seen by a psychiatrist, it was necessary to trv to design a system to pick out men who should he sutbjected to a further psvchiatric scrutiny. Carefully selected and trained members of the W.R.N.S., supervised by psychiatric social workers, have been used for this purpose. They check up the forms which all naval candidates at recruiting centres must now fill up about their work record and kindred matters, anid ask certain additional questions bearing on stabilitv. This system has been in operation for over a year but for various reasons it has only quite recently been possible to judge of its value. It seems to be an efficient method of doing what it set out to do, namely of indicating what men should receive further individual examination. It has been fouind that the proportion of men entering the Navy showing aniything positive is verv small.
The incidence of functional nervous disorders is largely dependent upon factors quite outside medical control. The Navy is singularlv fortunate in this respect in its traditions and high morale, and in the quality of its officers and petty officers. These factors enormously ease the bturden of those who have the privilege of wsorking in the Naval Medical Service.
Brigadier J. R. Rees : The Royal Societv of Mledicine's discussion in April 1941 (Section of Psvchiatrv 11ot ptiblishled) on the possibilitv of prediction of breakdowvn, along with many ptublished surveys of military patients in hospital, makes it appear that a minimum of 30 to 40% of these cases might have been predicted beforehand on their histories. One of the best and most practical comments made was Dr. Minski's letter to the Lancet of September 27, 1941, p. 382. We know from experience of the last war and of this that mild neurotic tendencies are no bar to service and that many men and women with definite neuroses do well: e.g. those suffering from anxiety, well-controlled, and from obsessional conscientiousness and drive. Many eccentrics do excellently, as might be imagined. There is no accurate method of forecasting who will break under prolonged physical and mental strain. On a small scale the experience of the last war has been repeated in Norway, France, Libya and Crete.
We do, however, know from past and recent experience that certain men do badly and are poor risks:
(a) Those of low intelligence with evidence of instability shown in a bad medical and occupational record.
(b) Those with a bad record from childhood and adolescence, shown by: (i) Frequent gastric " and "rheumatic " symptoms. (ii) Effort Many men should therefore be detected, and they are better left undisturbed in industry, so avoiding unnecessary dislocation of individuals and the community. The morale of the forces suffers always when men have to be discharged fairlv soon after admission, and this is a matter of the highest importance.
While the Recruiting Boards have done, and are performing, excellent work with their present facilities, it is worth recalling some of the suggestions previously made:
(1) That a questionnaire should be used, such as that produced by Dr. John Rickman at Wharncliffe Hospital, Sheffield.
(2) That wvhatever the difficulties, National Health Insurance and school medical records should be produced for each man and they should be instructed to bring letters from their private doctors.
(3) Police records should be available where such exist.
(4) More time should be available for the Board since it is impossible to take a thorough history or make an adequate judgment on many cases in the time at present available.
(5) Doctors from Recruiting Boards should visit Service Units so as to have a satisfactorv orientation and awareness of the needs of the modern Services.
The Army gets the bulk of the " psychopathic tenth ' who come into the Services and despite the manv efforts to employ men suitably in their own Units or through special postings to limited service of various kinds, there is a very high invaliding rate.
It is greatly to be hoped that there will be still better co-operation between the Services and the Recruiting Boards, and that from now' to the end of the wvar there will be steadv improvement in our knowledge of the requirements of the Services and in our combined medical contribtution to the war effort.
Group Captain R. D. Gillespie : The psychiatric observation from which has evolved most that is of value in war psychiatry is the importance of predisposition. It bears on the whole psychiatric policy in the Services, not onlv on the nroblem of the care of those who have broken down, but still more on the preventive aspect the care of personnel before they break down, and, above all, selection.
Whether the predisposing or constitutional factors are inherited or acquired is hardlv of practical importance as far as this war is concerned, since there is not time for the employment of the techniquie of psychotherapv that would remove factors acquired in very earlv life.
Some statistics wvill illtstrate the importance of predispositioni: Ouit of 251 flying personnel who broke down 150 or 60% showed predisp)osition of at least a moderate degree; out of 256 ground personnel who developed psychoneurotic ailments 222 or 87% showed a degree of predisposition which varied from " considerable ' to " severe ". The difference between the two groups in severity of predisposition is what might be expected in flving personnel compared with grotund personncl.
The fact that pre-existing factors are so important does not mean that psvchothera py itself iS useless. In so far as psychotherapy is practicable it has to deal with the reaction to the contemporary situation in most cases. In this connexion a distinction should be made between " war " neurosis in general and " battle ' neurosis. The majority of piublished descriptions of treatment of an analvtic kind, which are aniyway few, show Proceedings of the Royal Society of Mledicine 6 that the cases involved are not so much "battle" neuroses as neuroses depending on circumstances other than those of combat, such as separation. By employing, however, a superficial type of psychotherapy for the " battle " neuroses results are obtained which -ire not altogether unsatisfactory; but again the factor of predisposition stands out. In one group of 50 individuals 14 or approximately 28% were found to have been regarded as fit for full duty when the results were inspected two years later. In a second group of 52, 30 or just under 60% were found to have been passed for full duty when results wcre inspected at least a year afterwards. The difference between the two groups was almost entirely accounted for by the greater predisposition of the first group who had broken down much earlier in the war.
Prognosis.-The previous personality and amount and kind of predisposition is of foremost importance when forecasting the results of treatment. It is interesting to note that in the first group at the time of discharge from hospital the estimate was formed that 25% of them would return to full duty; this was just under the actual number when iuvestigation was made of the results two years later. In the less predisposed group the estimate at the time of their discharge was that just over 50% would return to full duty, and in fact, the ultimate figure was 60%. The correspondence is very close and the prognosis was based almost entirely on estimates of the amount of predisposition.
It follows from all this that probably the most useful contribution that psychiatry could make would consist in improving methods for detecting predisposition beforehand, i.e. in methods of selection. It can be said that there is reason to hope for improvement on the present methods, thus avoiding wastage in training.
There are two fundamental aspects to which psychiatry may help to make a contribution -in the field of intelligence, in collaboration with the psychologist; and in the field of temperament, in which psychiatrists have unique qualifications. Their daily life and work is mainly with problems of temperament, i.e. with qualities that more than anything else determine an individual's success or failure in life.
Inztelligence.-No one should be rejected on a group intelligence test alone. It must be supplemented with an individual test in every case in which there is a prospect of rejection on account of a low score on the group test. Factors likely to produce a low score in a group test, apart from intelligence, are lack of interest, emotional stress, unfamiliarity with paper and pencil tests, educational defect and age. The psychiatrist's job in connexion with group intelligence tests is: (1) To ensure that no one is rejected on a low score without an inidividual test and a considered assessment based on that.
(2) To see that the recruit is stable-the most important requirement of all. (3) To ensure that he is placed in an appropriate general type of job in the Service, i.e. one comnatible, as far as possible, with his intellectual and temperamental qualities. It is extremely improbable that there ever will be a group test that will enable us to dispense with individual examinations as to minimum fitness for a Service.
Temperamnent.-Group tests are of little or no value here. In fact tests of any kind, even individual tests, are of little account in this field. The psychiatric type of history is the foundation of assessment of temperament. It, however, can be reinforced by special techniques such as the Rorschach method, and by other " projection " tests. One of the clhief arguments against the use of the psychiatric method seems to be that the stress of war brings out unexpected qualities in some individuals who would almost certainly be rejected by psychiatrists. The answer to this is twofold: (1) That individuals mistakenly excluded from commissions and other duties by psychiatrists will still have a chance of proving their worth in the traditional way-in the field; and (2) that the individual regarded as potentially poor stuff by executive officers or doctors other than psychiatrists, is often regarded differently by the psychiatrist from his angle. On the other hand the speciously promising type, often regarded superficially as " keen " is liable to be spotted from the outset by psychiatric methods.
The arguments for psychiatric and psychological selection for (a) Service in general of any sort; (b) combatant duties; (c) technical duties, and (d) commissioned rank-all of which different functions necessitate the possession of different good qualities and the absence of other detrimental characteristics-are briefly these: (1) The orthodox methods are unscientific and not fully efficient, and there is wastage in consequence of this; (2) the use of psychiatric methods of selection for special jobs or for service of anv kind does not preclude subsequent selection along the old lines of trial and error in the field; (3) the degree of intelligence a candidate possesses can be fairly accurately assessed, and those who from lack of intelligence or lack of opportunity for education are incapable of fulfilling the necessary conditions can be eliminated, either completely if they are defective, or from skilled jobs or posts of responsibility if they lack the necessarv deeree of intelligence and a suitable temperament; (4) the temperamental aspects are difficult to assess and are the main cause of error, but experience with those who have failed has shown that the methods and criteria of psychiatry are adequate in the majority of cases to exDlain why these failures occur. The systematic application of these experiences to the selection process offers the chief hope' of improvement in the technique of'selection at the various levels in which it is employed.
Dr. Wm. M. Fairlie: Two recent official documents indicate that Medical Boards are primarily concerned w5th physical fitness, but the book of instructions issued to them, clearly and at some length, points out the importance of the nervous and mental states and indicates that cases showing minor defects may be acceptable for service, for there is an instruction to mark thcni "for observation during training". From the commencement of their work in 1939, Medical Boards have accepted their responsibilities with regard to the nervous and mental states and have endeavoured to carry out their instructions.
Provision is made in the book instructions whereby doubtful cases may be sent to consultants, but it has been found that such cases, sent to psychological consultants, almost invariably, ccme back labelled " unfit for service ".
It appears to be an Army order that all cases marked " for observation during training" mLust be referred to an Army psychologist immrdiately on joining up and cases have occuirred where, in spite of great care anid full investigation by the Recruiting Board before acceptance for service was recommended, the man has been discharged and home again almost within a week.
It seems useless to investigate recruits in an organized and controlled way, as is done by Medical Boards, and later, in the Services and on discharge, apply a totally different rcasoning. Let us have scme degree of commonsense and have a unified method of working. It must be bcrne in m1nd that Medical Boards have a very definite instruction of a different kind, viz. "that no men who are fit will be at liberty to evade their obligation " for service.
The investigation of the past of recruits so that more information about them may be available at Medical Boards could be done by a trained clerk, who would record the complete previous history of the recruit. This is carried out bv some Boards in particular cases but, if applied to all recruits, it would enable the Boards to have a truer presentation of each man, whereby it would be possible to place him in one of many more categories of fitness.
Consultants to Medical Boards are chosen by the Boards themselves and approved by the Ministry of National Service. Would it not be better for the Ministry to appoint the consuiltants dcrect?
The so-called intelligence test before Medical Boards should be abolished. It complicates the work of the Boards and, once its possibilities become known, it is likely to be the subject of abuse.
With regard to discharge from the Services it is suggested that the advisability of specialists acting on Boards dealing with cases involving their own specialty be considered.
The specialist's opinion should, of course, come before the Board but it seems inadvisable that he should act as a member of the Board. No one, however well intentioned, can act as a witness, advocate and judge in the same case.
Major H. B. Craigie: Emphasis has been laid unon the large number of recruits rejected by psychiatrists as unfit for further training. and unon the percentage of cases discharged from the Army on psychiatric grounds. It has been suggested that this rate of discharge is too high, and that many men so rejected or discharged would. if allowed or compelled to remain in the Army, ult matelv adapt themselves satisfactorily to active service conditions.
Experience gained in the Middle East Force during the last two years does not lend any support to this view.
A strikingly large percentage of the total nuimber of psychiatric cases arising in the Middle East Force during this neriod showed evidence of severe psychopathic traits in the previous history. These psychopathic traits were not of an abstruse character, nor based upon any controversial psvchopathological theory, but were of a fairly obvious and casilv recognizable type, which would have been evident in the taking of any careful case history.
In many cases (over 20%) there was a history of serious nervous breakdown in civil life; many patients had previously been patients in mental defective colonies or in mental hospitals: and in many more th^re was evidence of a bad orevijus record, of thq type deecribed by Brigadier Rees, dating from childhood and adolescence.
These cases represent the type which, during the personnel selection procedure of the General Service Intakes, are referred to the psychiatrist. and for whom the psychiatrist may recommend either some modified form of occupation within the Service, or discharge. The great majority of these cases could be easily recognized and assessed by a Recruiting Board if sufficient time was available to obtain a thorough history, and particularly if further details of the previous history were provided for the Board in questionnaire form.
This group of cases reacts badly to overseas service, or to the prospects of service in a forward area. Many develop a psychiatric breakdown on the voyage, have to be admitted to hospital on disembarkation, and may often have to be returned home without seeing any service at all (36 cases of this type were admitted direct from convoys to one psychiatric centre alone in the second quarter of 1942).
A very much larger percentage break down within a few weeks or months of arrival at an overseas station. It is perhaps important to remember that these cases are obvious not only to the psychiatrist but to other officers-they are often only sent to him as a last resort, when all the efforts of the Company Commanders and Unit Medical Officers have proved unsuccessful. It is clear that the efficiency of any Expeditionary Force must suffer if it includes large numbers of officers and men who, by virtue of their previous histories, are likely to develop a psychiatric breakdown.
The policy adopted in the Middle East Force was to avoid, so far as possible, evacuation of psychiatric cases, and to retain almost all these cases in the Command on at least some form of duty. Duties were readjusted, transfers to different arms of the Service arranged and ultimately a specialized rehabilitation battalion was formed, designed to cope solely and directly with these cases. Although this policy of retention was considered to be justified, and indeed almost unavoidable, under the circumstances prevailing, it presented many difficulties, and it was impossible to escape the conclusion that it would have been very much better for all concerned if they had not been drafted overseas or even, in many cases, not retained in the Army at all. In conclusion, it is possible that perhaps half of the work of psychiatrists in the Middle East Force would have been eliminated if the present selection procedure had been established earlier.
Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Hadfield: As a practical suggestion-if the Recruiting Boards could adopt the " Annexure Scheme " of the Army, whereby neurotics could be posted for certain civilian jobs in the Army (and could not be detailed for any other work by their Commanding Officers without reference to the War Office), there would be far fewer recruits graded as " unfit for any form of military service ' by the psychiatric specialists, far fewer misfits in the Services, and more effective service to the country. Major W. R. Reynell: At the outbreak of this war the Germans had 200 fully trained Army psychiatrists. All the men for Panzer units were carefully " hand picked ".
The state of our resources was very different. Only a small proportion of potential or actual psychoneurotics can be seen or treated by psychiatrists. The most profitable means of dealing with the problem of psychoneurotics in the Army is effective treatment at the source-Unit Medical Officers might sometimes take more responsibility for diagnosis and treatment of the " regressive " subject at the risk of missing an occasional " organic " case. Reference to specialists, repeated examination and hospital treatment, often lead to the development of severe psychoneurosis with unfavourable prognosis.
